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 Money laundering control: the South African model 
Louis de Koker 
INTRODUCTION 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 completes the broad legislative framework for 
money laundering control in South Africa. Core provisions of the Act came into effect on 1st 
February, 2002 thereby establishing the South African Financial Intelligence Centre &FIC), the 
Money Laundering Advisory Council &MLAC) and enabling the drafting of the regulations under the 
Act.1 It is envisaged that the other provisions of the Act, notably those that create customer 
identification, record-keeping and other compliance obligations, will enter into effect as soon as the 
relevant regulations are finalised and the FIC is operational.2 This paper provides a brief overview of 
the existing money laundering law in South Africa and discusses the core provisions of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act.3 
 
SOUTHAFRICAN MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES 
Although persons who intentionally involve them- selves in laundering can be prosecuted in terms of 
the South African common law as accessories after the fact in respect of the underlying offences,4 
South Africa followed the international approach in the 1990s and created a statutory framework to 
increase the reach of its criminal law relating to laundering.  
The first statutory laundering offences were introduced by the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act 140 of 1992.5 These offences were restricted to proceeds of drug-related crimes.6 Largely as a 
result of the restricted ambit of these provisions they did not prove effective in practice.7 In 1996 the 
Proceeds of Crime Act8 was promulgated. This Act broadened laundering offences to proceeds of all 
types of crimes and also provided for confiscation of proceeds of crime upon conviction of the 
criminal. 
In 1998 the South African government decided to introduce extraordinary measures against 
organised crime. A Prevention of Organised Crime Bill9 was drafted, which provided for particular 
offences relating to organised crime and street gang activity and for the introduction of American-
style civil forfeiture. The Bill also contained amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act that 
broadened the scope of its money laundering provisions and addressed constitutional concerns 
regarding some of its more draconian criminal confiscation provisions.10 During the parliamentary 
passage of the Bill it was decided to repeal the Proceeds of Crime Act and to re-enact its provisions, 
as amended in accordance with the proposals contained in the Bill, as part of the new Act.11 This 
process resulted in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 &POCA) which came into 
effect on 21st January, 1999. Apart from repealing the Proceeds of Crime Act, the Act also repealed 
the relevant provisions of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act. The provisions creating money 
laundering offences were therefore consolidated in one Act.12 POCA also criminalises certain acts 
relating to street gangs and organised crime syndicates and regulates criminal confiscation of proceeds 
of crime and civil forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. Despite the name of the Act 
the provisions relating to money laundering, criminal confiscation and civil forfeiture apply to the 
proceeds of all types of offences, whether committed by organised crime syndicates or individuals 
acting on their own.13 
The laundering provisions of POCA are some of the broadest in force internationally.14 In 
keeping with international standards, it creates the normal laundering offences by criminalising any 
act in respect of proceeds of crime which is likely to have the effect of concealing or disguising the 
nature, location or movement of the proceeds of crime or which is likely to assist a criminal to avoid 
prosecution or to remove or diminish such proceeds.15 It also criminalises the rendering of assistance 
to another person to enable him or her to benefit from crime and criminalises the acquisition, 
possession or use of proceeds of crime of another.16 It furthermore creates a whistle-blowing offence17 
and puts an obligation on every person carrying on business and every employee of a business to 
report any transaction, whether it was completed or not, which is suspected of having involved 
proceeds of crime or of facilitating the transfer of such proceeds.18 
Although the general tenor of these provisions is standard when measured against the laws of 
leading international jurisdictions, their ambit is not. First, these offences can be committed either 
intentionally or negligently.19 A person will commit an offence intentionally when he proceeds to act 
while he actually realises that the transaction involves proceeds of crime or when he wilfully chooses 
to be blind to the facts.20 The offences will be committed negligently if the person negligently fails to 
appreciate the true nature of the property involved in the transaction. In terms of POCA a person acts 
negligently if he fails to form conclusions which would have been formed by a reasonably diligent 
and vigilant person having both the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person in his position and the general knowledge, skill, training and 
experience that he or she in fact has.21 
Second, the laundering offences are not confined to proceeds of drug-related or serious 
offences, but can be committed in respect of the proceeds of any type of offence, whether committed 
in South Africa or elsewhere, whether committed before or after the commencement of POCA and 
irrespective of the amount involved.22 
Third, although the majority of offences can only be committed by third parties who facilitate 
the laundering of proceeds of another, the main laundering offences can be committed by the criminal 
who committed the underlying offence. Every act that the criminal commits in an attempt to hide, 
change or spend the proceeds can therefore constitute a laundering offence. 
Fourth, the Act requires the reporting of transactions that are suspicious because they may 
involve proceeds of crime or may facilitate the transfer of such proceeds, irrespective of the nature of 
the predicate offence or the amount involved.23 
Fifth, the penalties for these offences are harsh. If the laundering offence was committed in 
respect of proceeds of crime in general, the maximum sentence is R100m or 30 years. If it was 
committed in respect of the proceeds of racketeering, the maximum sentence is R1bn or life 
imprisonment. At the current exchange rate these amounts are respectively 
US$10m and US$100m. 
The broad ambit of these provisions ensures that law enforcement authorities can apply them 
with ease. Unfortunately their effectiveness has been undermined by the fact that the general money 
laundering control legislation took a number of years to be finalised. As a consequence, the offences 
had to be investigated and prosecuted although South Africa did not have a financial intelligence unit 
and while it lacked general legislation that required financial institutions to identify their clients and to 
maintain anti-laundering compliance and training programmes. The long-awaited Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act closes these important gaps and will ensure that the criminal provisions can be 
applied more effectively. 
Despite these gaps in the money laundering control framework, a number of important 
successes were achieved. More than 2,500 suspicious transaction reports have been filed with the 
South African Police Service since 1997.24 Investigations into statutory laundering offences 
committed in terms of the Proceeds of Crime Act resulted in the first two convictions for statutory 
laundering in 2001.25 A further eight persons were committed as accessories after the fact on the 
strength of their involvement in a laundering operation.26 The first conviction for statutory laundering 
under POCA was handed down on 12th April, 200227 and a number of further prosecutions are in their 
final stages. The prosecution rate is set to rise because a Proceeds of Crime Investigation Desk was 
established at the Commercial Branch Head Office of the South African Police Service on 1st 
January, 2002. This Desk will receive, evaluate, analyse and distribute the suspicious trans- action 
reports and other relevant information which is sent to the Commercial Branch. The Desk will 
improve the ability of the South African Police Service to process and investigate laundering reports 
as well as relevant information and intelligence. 
 
CURRENT MONEY LAUNDERING COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS 
Although South Africa lacked a general money laundering control framework, important building 
blocks of a compliance system have been in place for some time. 
South Africa, for instance, has a strict exchange control regime.28 The South African financial 
community is therefore accustomed to paying particular attention to international transactions with a 
view to determining their compliance with exchange control regulations. This system has certainly 
made South Africa a less attractive destination for foreign criminals. 
The gambling industry provides an example of an industry that is subject to a number of 
money laundering control obligations. Provincial gaming laws, for instance, prohibit certain cash 
transactions by casinos,29 require casinos to report gaming transactions that involve amounts in excess 
of threshold amounts to the provincial gaming boards30 and compel casinos to identify certain 
clients.31 The rules of the JSE Securities Exchange also create relevant obligations for exchange 
participants. For instance, stockbrokers are required to identify their clients, to verify prescribed 
particulars and to maintain compliance functions.32 The Exchange also maintains a surveillance 
department that monitors compliance with its rules. 
However, the sector with the most building blocks of a compliance system in place is the 
banking sector. Banks are required in terms of common law to identify and verify prospective clients 
who want to open bank accounts.33 The regulations under the Banks Act 94 of 1990 furthermore 
compels a bank to appoint a compliance officer with senior executive status in the bank and to 
maintain an independent and adequately resourced compliance function. Regulation 48 requires banks 
to implement and maintain policies and procedures to guard against the bank being used for purposes 
of market abuse and financial fraud, including insider trading, market manipulation and money 
laundering. As a minimum these policies and procedures must be adequate, inter alia, to ensure 
compliance with relevant legislation, to facilitate cooperation with law enforcement agencies, to 
identify customers and, in particular, to recognise suspicious customers and transactions, to provide 
adequate training and guidance to relevant staff and to report suspicious transactions. Any money 
laundering activity in which a bank was involved and which was not identified and reported 
timeously, must be reported to the Registrar of Banks in terms of Regulation 46. 
Many other non-banking financial institutions in South Africa, for instance the main 
insurance companies and foreign exchange dealers, also have money laundering compliance 
programmes. These programmes were mainly developed by internal audit, legal or compliance 
divisions who often relied on the support of organisations such as the Money Laundering Forum34 and 
the Compliance Institute of South Africa.35 
 
 
THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE ACT 38 OF 2001 (FICA) 
The origins of FICA can be traced back to August 1996 when the South African Law Commission 
published a Money Laundering Control Bill as part of a report entitled Money laundering and related 
matters.36 The Bill provided for regulatory structures and mechanisms to combat money laundering. 
However, the government did not take immediate action on the legislation.37 In 1998 the Department 
of Finance appointed a task team to advise it on the appropriateness of the Bill.38 The Department of 
Finance produced a new Financial Intelligence Centre Bill based on the recommendations of the 
Task Team.39 Further consultation with, especially, other government departments took place before 
the Bill was finally approved by Cabinet and submitted to Parliament in 2001.40 After much 
deliberation, public comment and extensive amendment the legislation was passed and it was signed 
by the President on 28th November, 2001. However, its provisions will enter into effect on dates fixed 
by the President by proclamation. The first such proclamation was published in January 2002. As a 
consequence the provisions regarding the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Centre and the 
Money Laundering Advisory Council as well as provisions that enable the writing of the regulations 
under the Act came into effect on 1st February, 2002.41 
Apart from providing for the establishment and operation of the Financial Intelligence Centre 
and the Money Laundering Advisory Council, FICA creates money laundering control obligations and 
regulates access to information.42 These obligations are primarily applicable to accountable 
institutions although some obligations extend to reporting institutions, to all persons involved in 
businesses and to international travellers. Accountable institutions include, inter alia, attorneys, estate 
agents, banks, long-term insurers, foreign exchange dealers, investments advisers and money 
remitters.43 Only two reporting institutions are listed in FICA, namely persons dealing in motor 
vehicles, as well as persons dealing in Krugerrands.44 
Although the reach of FICA appears clear at first glance, it may prove quite difficult to 
ascertain whether a particular person or business qualifies as an accountable institution and, if so, the 
extent to which an individual should comply with the Act. For instance, the list of accountable 
institutions in Schedule 1 to FICA lists as such an `attorney as defined in the Attorneys Act, 1979 
&Act No. 53 of 1979)'. Section 1 of the Attorneys Act defines an attorney as `any person duly 
admitted to practise as an attorney in any part of the Republic'. As a result, attorneys who are not 
currently practising but who are academics or legal advisers are also brought within the ambit of 
FICA.45 They are therefore saddled with the onerous compliance obligations that are created by FICA, 
such as the appointment of a compliance officer and the drafting of internal compliance rules. The 
definition also fails to make adequate provision for attorneys who practise in firms or in companies. 
The compliance obligations should attach to the firm or company rather than to every attorney 
individually in that firm or company. 
The definition of accountable institution also includes any person `that invests, keeps in safe 
custody, controls or administers trust property within the meaning of the Trust Property Control Act, 
1988 &Act No. 57 of 1988)'. This Act regulates specific aspects of the conduct of trustees. The 
consequence of this definition is that every trustee of a trust mortis causa will also be saddled with the 
onerous compliance duties. 
It is improbable that such unfortunate consequences as those outlined above were intended by 
the legislature. They will hopefully be addressed by means of amendments or softened by means of 
exemptions and/or the regulations under FICA. 
 
 
THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE (FIC) 
The principal objective of the FIC is to assist in the identification of the proceeds of unlawful 
activities and the combating of money laundering activities. Other objectives of the FIC include:46 
 
a) making information collected by it available to investigating authorities, the intelligence 
services and the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to facilitate the administration and 
enforcement of the laws of South Africa; and 
 
b) exchanging information with similar financial intelligence units in other countries regarding 
money laundering activities. 
 
The FIC will collect, retain, compile and analyse all information disclosed to it and obtained by it in 
terms of the Act. It will not investigate criminal activity, but will provide information to, advise and 
cooperate with intelligence services, investigating authorities and SARS who should carry out such 
investigations.47 
Although the FIC must monitor and give guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory 
bodies and other persons regarding the performance of their duties and their compliance with FICA,48 
the Act does not empower the FIC to supervise the accountable institutions. The supervisory functions 
will be performed by the relevant supervisory bodies listed in Schedule 2 to FICA.49 The list includes 
the Financial Services Board, the Reserve Bank, the Registrar of Companies,50 the Estate Agents 
Board, the Public Accountants and Auditors Board, the National Gambling Board, the JSE Securities 
Exchange and the Law Society of South Africa. 
The supervisory model, which was fashioned by FICA, is awkward. It requires the FIC to 
provide some guidance to accountable institutions and to monitor them, while entrusting the 
supervisory powers to the supervisory bodies.51 The model creates potential for territorial disputes 
between the FIC and the supervisory bodies and also among some of the bodies themselves. Whether 
the model will prove effective in practice will depend on the quality of the working relationships that 
can be formed between the different parties. Consideration will also have to be given to the current 
powers and capacities of the supervisory bodies to ensure that they have the ability to perform the 
functions envisaged in FICA. It will also be important to address the regulation or supervision of 
those accountable and reporting institutions do not fall within the current ambit of any of the listed 
supervisory bodies. Appropriate supervisory bodies for these institutions will have to be identified or 
created and designated as such, or the FIC will have to be given the necessary powers to supervise 
anti-laundering compliance by those institutions. 
FICA furthermore creates a special relationship between the FIC and SARS. The FIC data 
will assist SARS to combat tax evasion and to collect taxes more effectively. In fact, s. 29 
&suspicious and unusual transactions) explicitly requires all businesses to report any transactions that 
may be relevant to the investigation of any evasion or attempted evasion of a duty to pay a tax, levy or 
duty under any legislation that is administered by SARS.52 SARS, in turn, is required by FICA to 
divulge certain information relating to the possible abuse of an accountable institution for laundering, 
or its possible involvement therein, to the FIC.53 However, SARS is allowed by s. 36(2) of FICA to 
make reasonable procedural arrangements and to impose reasonable safeguards to maintain the 
confidentiality of the information which is disclosed in terms of FICA. 
 
THE MONEY LAUNDERING ADVISORY COUNCIL (MLAC) 
The MLAC will advise the Minister of Finance on policies and best practices regarding the combating 
of money laundering activities as well as the exercise by the minister of his powers under FICA. It 
will also advise the FIC concerning the performance of its functions and act as a forum in which the 
FIC, associations representing categories of accountable institutions, organs of state and supervisory 
bodies can consult one another.54 The MLAC is one of the parties that must be consulted before the 
minister may make, repeal or amend regulations under FICA, amend the lists of accountable 
institutions, supervisory bodies or reporting institutions or exempt anyone from compliance with 
provisions of FICA.55 
The MLAC will primarily consist of various government representatives and representatives 
of categories of accountable institutions and supervisory bodies.56 
 
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL OBLIGATIONS 
FICA imposes various money laundering control obligations on a variety of persons and accountable 
institutions. These obligations include a duty to identify clients; a duty to keep records of business 
relationships and single transactions; a duty to report certain transactions; a duty to appoint a 
compliance officer and a duty to train employees on their money laundering control obligations. 
These obligations are primarily imposed on accountable institutions, although some reporting 
obligations also extend to reporting institutions, persons involved in businesses and international 
travellers in general. 
 
Duty to identify clients 
Section 21(1) of FICA requires an accountable institution to establish and verify the identity of a 
prospective client before establishing a business relationship or concluding a single transaction with 
that client.57 
Accountable institutions are also required to establish similar facts in relation to clients that 
are parties to business relationships that were established before FICA took effect. In addition, the 
institution must trace all accounts at the institution that are involved in transactions concluded in the 
course of that relationship.58 In terms of s. 82&2)&1) this duty in respect of existing clients will only 
take effect one year after the general identification duty in s. 21(1) takes effect. Accountable 
institutions are therefore allowed a year to identify their existing clients who still have active business 
relationships with the institution.59 It seems as if the large banks and insurance companies will find it 
very difficult to comply with this obligation in such a relatively short period of time. Calls have 
therefore been made for an amendment to the legislation that will provide the larger accountable 
institutions with a more realistic timeframe within which this obligation could be met or, alternatively, 
for their complete or partial exemption from this obligation in the regulations.60 
FICA compels accountable institutions to establish the identity of their clients. Accountable 
institutions are not explicitly required to probe further and to establish the sources of the funds of a 
client, the occupation or business of that client, the client's net worth etc. Whether such information 
should be regarded as essential for customer identification in the banking industry, is currently being 
considered by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.61 However, if an institution has only the 
bare details of a client, it will lack information that could be used to profile that specific client and to 
correctly identify a suspicious and unusual transaction that may be concluded by that client.62 
 
Duty to keep records 
Accountable institutions are required to keep records of specific details regarding clients, agents and 
principals as well as their transactions63 for a period of at least five years.64 The FIC may have access 
to the records kept by or on behalf of the accountable institution. If the records are not by nature 
public records, access may be obtained by virtue of a warrant issued in chambers.65 
 
Reporting duties 
FICA creates a number of reporting duties relating to transactions involving cash amounts in excess of 
a prescribed amount, suspicious and unusual trans-actions, the conveyance of cash across the borders 
of South Africa and electronic transfers of money by accountable institutions. These threshold 
amounts are to be prescribed by regulation. 
 
Cash transactions 
Prescribed particulars of every transaction to which an accountable institution or a reporting 
institution is party and which involves the payment or receipt by the institution of an amount of cash 
exceeding a prescribed amount, must be furnished to the FIC within a prescribed period.66 `Cash' is 
defined in s. 1 as coin and paper of South Africa &or of another country if it is designated as legal 
tender, circulates as, and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in that country) 
and travellers' cheques. 
A transaction is defined in s. 1 as `a transaction concluded between a client and an 
accountable institution in accordance with the type of business carried on by that institution'. A 
transaction with a reporting institution does not constitute a transaction as defined in s. 1 because the 
definition limits the meaning of `transaction' to transactions with accountable institutions.67 If 
`transaction' in s. 28 is defined in terms of the definition in s. 1, reporting institutions will not have 
any reporting obligations in terms of that section. Such a result is clearly contrary to the intention of 
the legislature as expressed in FICA. It is therefore submitted that the definition of `transaction' 
should not be applied to s. 28. However, this matter should preferably be addressed by means of 
urgent amending legislation. 
 
Conveyance of cash to and from South Africa 
A person intending to convey an amount of cash in excess of a prescribed amount to or from South 
Africa must report prescribed particulars concerning that conveyance to a person designated by the 
minister, before the cash is conveyed. The designated person is then required to send a copy of the 
report to the FIC without delay.68 
 
Electronic transfers of money to and from South Africa 
If an accountable institution sends money in excess of a prescribed amount through electronic transfer 
across the borders of South Africa, or receives such a sum from abroad, on behalf of or on the 
instructions of another person, it must report prescribed particulars of that transfer to the FIC within a 
prescribed period after the transfer.69 
 
Suspicious and unusual transactions 
FICA will repeal s. 7 of POCA which currently regulates the reporting of suspicious transactions.70 It 
will also substitute the text of s. 7A of POCA with a different text.71 Section 7A provides that a person 
who is charged with negligently committing a laundering offence under POCA may validly raise as a 
defence the fact that he or she reported the trans- action as suspicious in terms of s. 7. After these 
amendments are made, the duty to report suspicious transactions will be regulated by s. 29 of FICA.72 
Section 7 of POCA and s. 29 of FICA differ in a number of respects, for instance: 
(a) Section 7 creates a reporting duty for a person who suspects certain facts while s. 29 applies 
to a person who has knowledge of certain facts or who suspects such facts. 
 
(b) Section 7 applies to transactions that the business is entering into while s. 29 also extends to 
transactions that were innocently entered into and even carried out by the business but are 
now suspect because of knowledge subsequently acquired or a suspicion subsequently formed 
(s. 29(1)(a) and (c)). 
 
(c) Section 7 reports must be made to a designated person, while s. 29 requires reports to be made 
to the FIC.  
 
(d) Section 29 has a wider ambit because it extends inter alia to transactions that have no 
apparent business or lawful purpose or that may be relevant to an investigation into the 
evasion of a tax, duty or levy administered by SARS. 
 
(e) Section 7 transactions must be reported within a reasonable time while s. 29 reports will have 
to be submitted within a prescribed time after the knowledge was acquired or the suspicion 
formed.73 
 
 Grounds for a suspicious or unusual transaction report 
FICA creates a very broad category of suspicious or unusual transactions that must be reported and 
also applies this duty to a broad spectrum of persons. 
Any person who carries on a business, who manages or is in charge of a business or who is 
employed by a business and who knows or suspects certain facts must report the grounds for the 
knowledge or suspicion and prescribed particulars regarding the transaction to the FIC within a 
prescribed period after he acquired the knowledge or formed the suspicion.74 The facts may relate to 
the following:75 
 
(a) The business has received or is about to receive the proceeds of unlawful activities; 
 
(b) a transaction or series of transactions to which the business is a party: 
i. facilitated or is likely to facilitate the transfer of proceeds of unlawful activities; 
ii. has no apparent business or lawful purpose; 
iii. is conducted to avoid giving rise to a reporting duty under FICA; or 
iv. may be relevant to the investigation of an evasion or attempted evasion of a duty to 
pay any tax, duty or levy imposed by legislation administered by the Commissioner 
of SARS; or 
 
(c) the business has been used or is about to be used in any way for money laundering purposes.76 
 
Disclosure 
A person who makes a report or must make a report and any person who knows or suspects that a 
report has been made or is to be made, may only disclose information regarding that report within the 
scope of that person's powers and duties in terms of legislation, for the purpose of carrying out the 
provisions of FICA, for the purposes of legal proceedings, or in terms of a court order.77 
 
Offence and defence 
Section 69 of FICA provides a special defence to a charge based on the failure to report an unusual or 
suspicious transaction to the FIC. If a person who is an employee, director or trustee of, or a partner 
in, an accountable institution is charged with committing an offence under s. 52, that person may raise 
as a defence the fact that he or she had: 
 
(a) complied with the applicable obligations in terms of the internal rules relating to the reporting 
of information of the accountable institution; 
 
(b) reported the matter to the person charged with the responsibility of ensuring compliance by 
the accountable institution with its duties under this Act; or 
 
(c) reported the matter to his or her superior, if any, if: 
i. the accountable institution had not appointed such a person or established such rules; 
ii. the accountable institution had not complied with its obligations in s. 42(3) in respect 
of that person (copy of the rules were not made available by the institution to that 
person); or 
iii. the internal rules did not apply to that person. 
 
In essence, s. 69 allows persons not to report a transaction directly to the FIC but to comply with the 
internal rules of their business that may allow them to report the s. 29 transactions internally to a 
person or unit who will consider the information and will lodge a report with the FIC if it is 
warranted. In certain cases an employee may simply report the matter to a superior and, if that can be 
proved, the person will have a valid defence if he or she is charged with not reporting the transaction 
to the FIC directly. The defence is limited to persons who are employees, directors or trustees of, or 
partners in, accountable institutions. An important omission from this list appears to be members of 
close corporations. How- ever, many such members may qualify as employees and may utilise the 
defence in that capacity.78 
A person with a reporting obligation under s. 29 will often have such an obligation because he 
or she is involved in a possible laundering transaction. Apart from a defence to a charge under s. 29, 
the reporter therefore also requires a valid defence against a charge based on a contravention of the 
relevant provisions of POCA. FICA will amend s. 7A of POCA to provide such a defence.79 When 
this amendment comes into operation, s. 7A will allow a person to raise as a defence the fact that he 
or she had reported a knowledge or suspicion in terms of s. 29 of FICA if he or she is charged with 
committing an offence under s. 2(1)&a) or &b), 4, 5 or 6 of POCA. In addition, a defence which is 
similar to the s. 69 internal reporting defence will be inserted by FICA into s. 7A. However, this 
defence relating to internal reporting will only be available to employees of accountable institutions. 
As a result, employees of non-accountable institutions will not be able to defend themselves against a 
charge of money laundering under the specific sections of POCA, by proving that they followed 
internal procedures or, in the specific cases set out in the provision, that they reported the transaction 
to their superiors. They will only have such a defence if they reported the transaction directly to the 
FIC in terms of s. 29 of FICA. 
The limited ambit of the new internal reporting defence in s. 7A may also expose some role-
players in accountable institutions to liability. The s. 69 internal reporting defence to a charge of non- 
reporting (s. 52) is available to persons who are employees, directors or trustees of, or partners in, 
accountable institutions. However, the s. 7A internal reporting defence to a charge of money 
laundering under specific sections of POCA is only available to employees of accountable 
institutions. Directors and trustees of, or partners in, accountable institutions who are not also 
employees of accountable institutions are therefore afforded a defence against a charge of non-
reporting if they report internally, but are not shielded from criminal liability for money laundering 
under POCA. This result is unfortunate and the matter will hopefully be addressed by means of an 
appropriate amendment to the new text envisaged for s. 7A. In the meantime, it is advisable to ensure 
that persons associated with accountable institutions and who are not employees of accountable 
institutions report directly to the FIC, in order to ensure that they enjoy sufficient protection against 
criminal liability in this respect. 
 
Reporting - general provisions 
Request for further information 
A reporter who submitted a report in terms of s. 28 (transaction involving cash in excess of a 
prescribed amount), s. 29 (unusual and suspicious transactions) or s. 31 (electronic transfer of money 
across the border) may be requested by the FIC or other specified authorities and officials to furnish 
them with such additional information concerning the report and the grounds for the report as may 
reasonably be required to perform their functions (s. 32). The reporter must furnish the information 
that he has available to the FIC without delay.80 
 
Continuation and suspension of transactions 
A reporter who reports a transaction in terms of s. 28 (transaction involving cash in excess of a 
prescribed amount) or s. 29 (unusual and suspicious transactions) may continue and carry out the 
transaction unless the FIC directs the suspension of the transaction.81 The FIC may issue such a 
directive in writing after consultation with the institution or person concerned, if it has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the trans- action is unusual or suspicious as set out in s. 29.82 The directive 
may require the institution or person not to proceed with the transaction or any other transaction in 
respect of funds affected by the particular transaction for a period not exceeding five days, to allow 
the FIC to make inquiries about the transaction or to inform and advise an investigating authority.83 
Such a directive cannot be issued in respect of transactions that are carried out on a regulated financial 
market.84 
Confidentiality and privilege 
FICA overrides most of the secrecy and confidentiality obligations in South African law. No duty of 
secrecy or confidentiality or any other statutory or common law restriction on the disclosure of 
information affects any duty of an institution, person or SARS to report or to allow access to 
information in terms of Chapter 3 Part 3 &reporting duties and access to information) of FICA (s. 
37(1)). However, this provision does not apply to the common law right to legal professional privilege 
as between an attorney and an attorney's client in respect of communications made in confidence 
between: 
 
(a) the attorney and the attorney's client for purposes of legal advice or litigation which is 
pending or contemplated or which has commenced; 
or 
 
(b) a third party and an attorney for purposes of litigation which is pending or contemplated or 
has commenced (s. 37(2)). 
 
The protection enjoyed under s. 37(2) is wider than the current protection in terms of s. 7&5) of 
POCA which restricts the legal professional privilege to information communicated to the attorney to 
enable him to provide advice, to defend the client or to render other assistance to the client in 
connection with an offence: 
 
(a) of which the client is charged; 
 
(b) in respect of which he has been arrested or summoned to appear in court; or 
 
 
(c) in respect of which an investigation is being conducted against him or her with a view to 
institute criminal proceedings. 
 
Protection of reporters, information and evidence 
No criminal or civil action can be instituted against an institution, a person or SARS if it complies in 
good faith with the obligations in terms of Chapter 3 Part 3 (reporting duties and access to 
information) of FICA or against any person acting on their behalf.85 A person who made, initiated or 
contributed to a report that was submitted in terms of s. 28 (trans- action involving cash in excess of a 
prescribed amount), s. 29 (unusual and suspicious transactions) or s. 31 &electronic transfer of money 
across the border) or who has furnished additional information concerning such a report or the 
grounds for the report in terms of FICA enjoys protection under s. 38: such a person can give 
evidence in criminal proceedings arising from the report, but cannot be compelled to do so.86 
Section 39 provides that an official of the FIC may issue a certificate certifying that 
information specified in the certificate was reported or sent to the FIC in terms of the provisions of 
FICA requiring reports to be made. That certificate is, subject to the exclusions in s. 38, on its mere 
production in any matter before a court admissible as evidence of any fact contained in it of which 
direct oral evidence would be permissible.87 
 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
A number of provisions of the Act regulate the access to information by the FIC as well as access to 
information held by the FIC. Important provisions allowing access to information by the FIC include 
the following: 
(a) An authorised representative of the FIC may, by virtue of a warrant issued in chambers by a 
magistrate, judge or regional magistrate, examine and make extracts from or copies of records 
kept under s. 22. These records contain details regarding the identification of the clients, 
business relationships and single transactions. The warrant is only required if the records are 
not public records. It may only be issued if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
records may assist the FIC to identify the proceeds of unlawful activities or to combat money 
laundering activities.88 
 
(b) The FIC may require an accountable institution to advise whether a particular person is or was 
a client, represented a client or was represented by a client.89 
 
 
(c) Reporters of transactions may be required to furnish the FIC with additional information 
regarding the report and the grounds for the report.90 
 
(d) The FIC may apply to a judge for a monitoring order requiring an accountable institution to 
furnish information to the FIC regarding transactions concluded with the institution by a  
specified person or transactions conducted in respect of a specified account or facility at the 
institution. No notice of the application or hearing is given to the person involved in the 
suspected money laundering activity.91 The order may be issued if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person engaged or may engage in an unusual or suspicious 
transaction or that the account was or may be used for such purposes. The order will lapse 
after three months unless it is extended.92 
 
 
(e) If a supervisory body or SARS knows or suspects that an accountable institution is wittingly 
or unwittingly involved in an unusual or suspicious transaction, it must inform the FIC and 
furnish the FIC with any records regarding that knowledge or suspicion which the Centre may 
reasonably require to achieve its objectives.93 If the FIC believes that a supervisory body or 
SARS have such information, it may request the body or SARS to confirm or rebut that 
belief. If the belief is confirmed, certain information must be provided to the FIC.94 These 
bodies may make reasonable procedural arrangements and impose reasonable safeguards to 
maintain the confidentiality of any information.95 
Section 40 is the main provision that regulates access to the information held by the FIC. In essence, 
investigating authorities, SARS and intelligence services may be provided with information on 
request or at the initiative of the FIC. Information may be provided to foreign entities performing 
functions similar to those of the FIC, pursuant to a formal, written agreement between the FIC and 
that entity or its authority.96 The FIC may decide to provide information to an accountable or 
reporting institution or person regarding steps taken by the FIC in connection with transactions that it 
reported to the FIC, unless it would be inappropriate to disclose such information. Information may 
also be supplied to a supervisory body to enable it to exercise its powers and perform its functions in 
relation to an accountable institution. In addition, information may be supplied in terms of a court 
order or in terms of other national legislation.97 The most important general national legislation 
regulating an application for access to information is the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000. This Act gives effect to the constitutional right of access to information held by public bodies as 
well as access to information held by private bodies that is required for the exercise or protection of 
any right. However, the right of access to information is not absolute and the Act lists specific 
grounds for refusal of access to records. 
 
MEASURES TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE BY ACCOUNTABLE INSTITUTIONS 
FICA creates the normal compliance obligations that are associated with money laundering control 
systems.98 It requires every accountable institution to formulate and implement internal rules 
concerning:99 
 
(a) the establishment and verification of the identity of persons which it must identify in terms of 
FICA; 
 
(b) the information of which record must be kept in terms of FICA; 
 
 
(c) how and where those records must be kept; 
 
 
(d) the steps to be taken to determine when a transaction is reportable to ensure that the 
institution complies with its reporting duties under FICA; and 
 
(e) other matters as may be prescribed by regulation. 
 
An accountable institution must provide training to its employees to enable them to comply with 
FICA and the relevant internal rules.100 It must furthermore appoint a person with the responsibility to 
ensure compliance by the employees of the accountable institution with FICA and the internal rules as 
well as compliance by the accountable institution with its obligations under FICA.101 
FICA creates an onerous duty for the person who is appointed to shoulder this responsibility 
in a company. In general, the responsibility to ensure compliance in a business resides with the 
management of the business as well as with every employee that has to comply. Compliance officers 
assist management and the employees to discharge this duty by designing and operating appropriate 
systems.102 However, the person appointed under FICA will have the responsibility to ensure 
compliance by the business. Compliance officers have already indicated an unwillingness to accept 
this appointment. They are reluctant to shoulder this burden unless they have all the powers and 
resources that will be required to enable them to ensure compliance. It is probable therefore that the 
managing directors of many companies will be appointed in terms of FICA as the responsible officers 




FICA gives rise to a large number of offences. The majority of these offences carry a penalty of 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10m.103 These offences 
were generally discussed in context in the general discussions of the provisions above. In addition to 
those offences, Chapter 4 of FICA also creates the following offences: 
 
(a) Any person who obstructs, hinders or threatens an official or representative of the FIC in the 
performance of their duties or the exercise of their powers in terms of FICA commits an 
offence.104 
 
(b) Any person who conducts, or causes to be conducted, two or more transactions with the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of avoiding giving rise to a reporting duty under FICA is guilty 
of an offence.105 
 
 
(c) Any person who, without authority to do so, 
i. wilfully accesses or causes any other person to access any computer system that 
belongs to, or is under the control of, the FIC, or any application or data held in such 
a computer system;106 
ii. wilfully causes any computer system that belongs to, or is under the control of, the 
FIC, to perform or fail to perform a function;107 or 
iii. wilfully causes a computer system that belongs to, or is under the control of, the FIC, 
or any application or data held in such a computer system, to be modified, destroyed, 
erased or the operation or reliability of such a computer system, application or data to 
be otherwise impaired;108 
also commits an offence. 
 
SEARCH, SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE 
Although POCA regulates general criminal confiscation of proceeds of crime as well as civil 
forfeiture of such proceeds and instrumentalities, cash that is transported across South Africa's borders 
may be forfeited under FICA if the required report is not filed. 
FICA provides for the seizure of any cash which is transported or is about to be transported 
across the borders of South Africa if the cash exceeds the prescribed limit and there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an offence under s. 54 (intentional failure to report conveyance of cash in 
excess of prescribed amount across border) has been or is about to be committed. If a person is 
convicted of the offence, the court must, in addition to any punishment that may be imposed, declare 
the cash amount that should have been reported, to be forfeited to the state.109 A similar duty is 
imposed on the court if a person is convicted under s. 64 &conducting transactions to avoid giving 
rise to a reporting duty under FICA). The forfeiture may not affect the interests of any innocent party 
in the cash or property concerned if that person proves: 
 
(a) that he or she acquired the interest in that cash or property in good faith; and 
 
(b) that he or she did not know that the cash or property in question was: 
i. conveyed as contemplated in s. 30(1) or that he or she could not prevent such cash 
from being so conveyed; or 
ii. used in the transactions contemplated in s. 64 or that he or she could not prevent the 
property from being so used, as the case may be.110 
 
FICA also provides that innocent parties who meet the above criteria may approach the court within 
three years of the forfeiture order in order to retrieve their property or interests or to receive 
compensation. Although FICA provides protection for the rights and interests of innocent third 
parties, it is important to note that the protection does not extend to interested parties who were 
merely unaware of the intention to commit an offence. It is limited to parties who can prove that they 
did not know that the cash or property was to be conveyed across the borders of South Africa or used 
in transactions contemplated in s. 64. 
 
AMENDMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS 
FICA provides procedures in terms of which the minister may make amendments to the lists of 
accountable institutions (Schedule 1), supervisory bodies (Schedule 2) and reporting institutions 
(Schedule 3).111 The procedures allow for consultation and additions or deletions from the list requires 
parliamentary approval.  
The minister may also, after consulting the MLAC and the FIC and on conditions and for a 
period deter- mined by the minister, exempt a person, an accountable institution or a category of 
persons or accountable institutions from compliance with a pro- vision of FICA. Such an exemption 
may also be granted in respect of categories of transactions. Proposed exemptions must be tabled in 
Parliament before publication in the Gazette. An exemption may be withdrawn or amended by the 
minister after consultation with the MLAC and the FIC. 
 
CONCLUSION 
FICA and POCA provides a comprehensive legislative framework for money laundering control in 
South Africa. Although FICA ensures that the South African legislation will be substantially 
compliant with the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), it is important 
to appreciate that the South African money laundering control model has many unique elements and 
that it is more comprehensive than those of many of the members of the FATF. These unique 
elements were specifically included to ensure that money laundering control could be implemented 
effectively in South Africa. However, the practical effectiveness of the legislative framework will be 
determined by the way in which the legislation is implemented. 
Some of the provisions of FICA may be open to challenge in terms of the progressive Bill of 
Rights of South Africa. Constitutional litigation may follow in respect of issues such as the 
infringement of privacy and the breach of confidentiality under FICA, the information sharing 
provisions that allow the South African Revenue Service to disclose certain information of tax payers, 
the proportionality concerns that are raised by the forfeiture provisions of FICA and a denial of access 
to sensitive information and records held by the FIC.112 The success of such challenges will depend 
largely on the way in which the relevant powers are exercised by relevant bodies. If they are mindful 
of the civil liberties issues that the legislation raises, they may circumvent potential constitutional 
pitfalls by refraining from exercising the more controversial powers that FICA affords them. 
The effectiveness of the FIC will also be determined by the relationships that it forms with the 
main role players in the criminal justice system, with the supervisory bodies and also with its 
international counterparts. If the FIC succeeds in creating facilitative and open working relationships 
with these parties, it will become a vital support unit for law enforcement in general in the criminal 
justice system. 
However, probably the most important relationship that must be nurtured is the relationship 
between the FIC and the business community. The leading members of the business community have 
already shown their commitment to money laundering control. Their businesses have maintained 
money laundering compliance programmes in the absence of statutory requirements to have such 
programmes. The South African criminal justice system does not have sufficient resources to enforce 
compliance by all businesses. However, it may harness the goodwill of the business community, its 
commitment to the principles of good corporate governance and corporate citizenship and its will to 
combat crime in South Africa and coopt the community into a self-regulatory partnership. A 
partnership approach was followed in the drafting of the legislation. If this partnership is sustained 
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failure by the third party to comply with the requirements of the Act (s. 24). If an accountable 
institution appoints a third party to perform such duties it must provide the FIC forthwith with 
prescribed information regarding the third party (s. 24(3)). 
64) Records relating to the establishment of a business relation-ship must be kept for at least five 
years from the date on which the business relationship is terminated while records relating to 
a transaction must be kept for at least five years from the date on which the transaction is 
concluded (see s. 23). An accountable institution that fails to keep a record of information in 
terms of s. 22&1) &record to be kept of business relationship and transactions); or keep such 
records in terms of s. 23 (period for which records must be kept) or s. 24(1) (records may be 
kept by third parties); comply with the provisions of s. 24(3) (providing the FIC with the 
details of the third party appointed to keep the records); or give all reasonable assistance to a 
representative of the FIC in accordance with s. 26(5) (FIC's access to records), commits an 
offence (ss. 47 and 49). Any person who wilfully tampers with a record kept in terms of s. 22 
(record to be kept of business relationship and transactions) or s. 24(1) (records may be kept 
by third parties); or destroys such a record, otherwise than in accordance with s. 23 (period 
for which records must be kept), commits an offence (s. 48). These offences carry a penalty of 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10 million (s. 68). 
65) Section 26. 
66) Section 28. An accountable institution or reporting institution that fails, within the prescribed 
period, to report to the FIC the prescribed information in respect of a cash transaction in 
accordance with s. 28 commits an offence (s. 51). The offence carries a penalty of 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10m (s. 68). 
67) The same argument applies in respect of non-accountable institutions and the obligation to 
report suspicious transactions under s. 29 of FICA. 
68) Section 30&2). Any person who wilfully fails to report the conveyance of cash into or out of 
South Africa in accordance with s. 30(1) commits an offence (s. 54). It is important to note 
that this offence can only be committed by a person who wilfully fails to report the 
conveyance. This offence carries a penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 
years or a fine not exceeding R10m (s. 68). If the person referred to in s. 30(2) fails to send a 
report regarding the conveyance of cash to the FIC in accordance with that section, he 
commits an offence under s. 55. This offence carries a penalty of imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding R1m (s. 68(2)). 
69) Section 31. An accountable institution that fails to comply with this obligation commits an 
offence (s. 56). This offence carries a penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 
years or a fine not exceeding R10m (s. 68). 
70) See, in general, de Koker, ref. 3 above, para. 3.3; Schulze, H.(2001) `Big Sister Is Watching 
You: Banking Confidentiality and Secrecy under Siege', SA Merc LJ, p. 601. 
71) Section 79 read with s. 82(2) and Schedule 4. 
72) The provision of FICA that will effect this amendment is not yet in force. In terms of s. 81 of 
FICA reports must be submitted in terms of s. 7 of POCA until s. 79 of FICA comes into 
operation. After the commencement of s. 79, any investigation of a prior offence in terms of s. 
7 of POCA and any prosecution for such an offence may continue as if s. 79 had not come 
into operation (s. 81(2) and (3)). 
73) Section 29 does not address the same aspects that are addressed by s. 7 of POCA. Section 29, 
for instance, also regulates whistle-blowing, which is addressed by s. 75 of POCA. The 
format of the report and requests for further information &s. 7(2), (3) and (4) of POCA) are 
regulated by s. 32. The right to continue with a transaction (s. 7(6) of POCA) is regulated by 
ss. 33 and 34 and the offences (s. 7)7) of POCA) are now set out in Chapter 4 of FICA. 
74) Section 29(1). 
75) Section 29(1). Transactions in respect of which enquiries were made but which were not 
concluded must also be reported if they may have caused any of the above consequences (s. 
29(2)). Some of the obligations under s. 29(1)(b) will be very difficult to meet. For instance, 
s. 29(1)(b)(ii) calls for a judgment as to whether a particular transaction has an apparent 
business or lawful purpose. In practice it will be virtually impossible to train all employees to 
identify such transactions or to design systems that will accurately detect all such 
transactions. It is probable that only those transactions that have been structured so crudely 
that they obviously fall within the ambit of s. 29(1)(b)(ii) will be identified as such. Section 
29(1)(b)(iii) calls for the reporting of all transactions that may be relevant to the investigation 
of an evasion or attempted evasion of a tax, duty or levy administered by SARS. In essence, 
all transactions may be relevant to such an investigation. The section does not state whether 
such an investigation must have been launched and that the institution must have been 
notified about the investigation or whether the institution should anticipate such an 
investigation. The transaction does not need to constitute an act of tax evasion. It must simply 
be relevant to an investigation of attempted tax evasion. An institution must therefore also 
judge whether SARS will regard a particular transaction as relevant to such an investigation. 
These duties are so onerous that it would have been preferable for the wording to be clear and 
the ambit of the duties to be more limited. 
76) Any person within the ambit of s. 29(1) or (2) who fails, within the prescribed period, to 
report to the FIC the prescribed information in respect of a suspicious or unusual transaction 
or series of transactions or enquiry in accordance with s. 29; or who reasonably ought to have 
known or suspected that any of the facts requiring the submission of a report regarding 
suspicious or unusual transactions in terms of s. 29, and who negligently fails to report the 
transaction, the series of transactions or the enquiry commits an offence (s. 52(1) and (2)). 
These offences carry a penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a fine 
not exceeding R10m (s. 68). 
77) Section 29(3) and (4). Such a person who discloses a fact or information contemplated in that 
section, otherwise than in the circumstances or for the purposes authorised in that section 
commits an offence in terms of s. 53. The offence carries a penalty of imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10m (s. 68). 
78) See also ref. 50 above in respect of the fact that the Registrar of Companies was listed as a 
supervisory body but not the Registrar of Close Corporations. 
79) Section 79 read with Schedule 4 of FICA. 
80) Section 34. Failure to comply with the request constitutes an offence (s. 57) that carries a 
penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10m (s. 
68). 
81) Section 33. An accountable institution that fails to comply with a directive by the FIC to 
suspend a transaction commits an offence (s. 58) that carries a penalty of imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10m (s. 68). 
82) It is doubtful whether this power will be exercised often. The international experience in this 
regard is not very positive. FATF, ref. 19 above, para. 72: `A number of other issues were 
commented upon in several reports. One was the power . . . to suspend transactions that were 
the subject of an STR. Where a formal power exists to order such a suspension, the length of 
time of the suspension varies between 24 hours and five days, and in many countries it seems 
to have been very rarely used. Despite this, Swiss law provides that all transactions are 
automatically suspended for a five-day period, and it was felt that (this) period is sufficient to 
gather the evidence needed to commence proceedings. However, the practical experience in 
other members indicates that the power may be occasionally helpful, but is not likely to be a 
significant tool (particularly when institutions will often cooperate with law enforcement 
voluntarily to increase the time it takes to process a transaction.) 
83) For purposes of calculating the five-day period, Saturdays, Sundays and proclaimed public 
holidays are not taken into account (s. 34(2)). 
84) Section 34(3). 
85) Section 38(1). 
86) Section 38(2). No evidence regarding the identity of that person is admissible as evidence in 
criminal proceedings unless that person testifies at those proceedings (s. 38(3)). Section 38(3) 
also excludes evidence concerning the `contents or nature of such additional information and 
grounds' unless the person testifies.  
87) If a person who has made, initiated or contributed to a report in terms of s. 28 (transaction 
involving cash in excess of a prescribed amount), s. 29 (unusual and suspicious transactions) 
or s. 31 (electronic transfer of money across the border) or who has furnished additional 
information concerning such a report or the grounds for the report in terms of FICA declines 
to give evidence, the FIC may, by way of the certificate, disclose as evidence the information 
received in the initial report. However, the identity of the reporter as well as the contents and 
nature of any additional information may not be disclosed in the certificate. 
88) See also `Duty to keep records' above. 
89) Section 27. Failure to furnish this information to the FIC constitutes an offence (s. 50) that 
carries a penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding 
R10m (s. 68). 
90) Section 32. See also `Request for further information' above. 
91) Section 35(4). 
92) Section 35(2). An accountable institution that fails to comply with such an order commits an 
offence (s. 59) that carries a penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a 
fine not exceeding R10m (s. 68). 
93) Section 36(1). 
94) Section 36(2). 
95) Section 36(2). 
96) Section 40(1)(b) and 40(4) and (5). 
97) No person may disclose confidential information held by or obtained from the FIC except 
within the scope of that person's statutory powers and duties, for purposes of carrying out the 
provisions of FICA, with the permission of FICA, or for the purposes of legal proceedings or 
in terms of a court order (s. 41). Any person who discloses confidential information held by 
or obtained from the FIC or who uses such information contrary to s. 40 or who wilfully 
destroys or in any other way tampers with information kept by the FIC for the purposes of 
FICA; or knows, suspects or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that information 
has been disclosed to the FIC or that an investigation is being, or may be, conducted as a 
result of information that has been or is to be disclosed to the FIC, and who directly or 
indirectly alerts, or brings information to the attention of another person which will or is 
likely to prejudice such an investigation, commits an offence (s. 60&1)). These offences carry 
a penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R10m 
(s. 68). 
98) FICA enforces the requirements of Recommendation 20 of the 40 Recommendations of the 
Financial Action Task Force in all but two respects: it does not explicitly require an 
accountable institution to have adequate screening procedures to ensure high standards when 
hiring employees and does not require the institution to have an audit function to test its 
compliance system. However, in practice the majority of financial institutions maintain 
comprehensive management systems that provide for screening of employees as well as 
internal audit and compliance systems that will audit the effectiveness of their money 
laundering control systems. 
99) Section 42(1). These rules, which must comply with prescribed requirements, must be made 
available to every employee involved in transactions to which FICA applies (s. 42(3) and (4)). 
The FIC and the relevant supervisory body may also request copies of the rules. 
100) Section 43(a). 
101) An accountable institution that fails to formulate and implement the internal rules; or 
to make them available to its employees in accordance with s. 42(3) or to the FIC or a 
supervisory body in terms of s. 42(4); or to provide training to its employees in accordance 
with s. 43(a); or to appoint the person referred to in s. 43(b) &person with responsibility to 
ensure compliance) commits an offence under s. 62. This offence carries a penalty of 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or a ®ne not exceeding R1m. See s. 68(2). 
102) Newton, A. (1998) Compliance: Making Ethics Work in Financial Services, Financial 
Times Pitman Publishing, London, pp. 72±74; Sharpe, B. (1996) Making Legal Compliance 
Work, CCH Australian Ltd, NSW, pp. 55±56: `While the compliance staff engage in 
compliance activities, they do not comply for the company on a day-to-day basis. Their 
proper role is to cause other people [operating people] to carry out effective compliance and 
to assist, coordinate and ensure the consistency of the whole system.' 
103)  Section 68. 
104) Section 63. 
105) Section 64. This offence addresses inter alia `smurfing'. Smurfing takes place where 
a transaction involving cash in excess of the threshold is structured and divided into smaller 
transactions involving amounts below the threshold in order to avoid being reported. 
However, the provision also overlaps with many of the money laundering offences in terms of 
POCA, for instance the offences that can be committed where persons structure transactions 
to hide or disguise the true nature of ill-gotten gains. They normally attempt to structure the 
transactions in such a way as to avoid detection and reporting. Such persons can be 
prosecuted under the relevant provisions of POCA and/or under s. 64, if the transactions meet 
the requirements of s. 64. 
106) Section 65(1). 
107) Section 65(2). 
108) Section 66. Various terms used in ss. 65 and 66 are defined ins. 67. 
109) Section 70(4). This provision obviously raises excessive fines and proportionality 
concerns. See US v Bajakajian 118 S.Ct 2028 (1998). 
110) Section 70&6). 
111) Sections 73, 75 and 76. 
112) See, in particular, the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
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